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The recent financial crisis and historical record suggest important lessons about the design of 
national pension systems. First, wide fluctuation in asset returns makes it hard for well-
informed savers to select a saving rate or a sensible investment strategy for DC pensions. 
Workers who follow identical investment strategies but who retire a few years apart can 
receive DC pensions that are startlingly unequal. Second, it is hard for ordinary workers, as 
opposed to optimal planners, to make sensible choices about portfolio allocation. Their 
investment errors mean that actual returns fall short of the theoretical returns that could be 
earned by a well-informed, disciplined investor. 
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THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 
Washington, DC  USA 
 
THE TOPIC OF THIS CONFERENCE is “rethinking social security privatization.” In view of recent 
events, it is natural to begin rethinking by considering the lessons of the financial crisis for the 
design of national pension systems.  The lessons I discuss are not new ones.  They are old 
lessons, ones we could have inferred from economic theory, practical experience, and financial 
market history known before the crisis began.   
The first lesson is widely recognized in the finance literature, and it was vividly 
demonstrated by asset price movements in the past year.  Asset prices and real returns are highly 
uncertain in capitalist economies.  They fluctuate widely and unpredictably from one year to the 
next, from one decade to the next, and from one quarter century to the next.  Over a long time 
horizon, investors can usually expect to obtain better returns if they accept greater year-to-year 
variability in returns.  This empirical regularity does not offer any guarantees, however.  Over 
investment horizons that are relevant to retirement investing, the range of observed historical 
returns is quite wide.  The range is so wide, in fact, that it is hard for optimal planners to decide 
how much of their salaries to set aside for retirement consumption, assuming they want to enjoy 
stable annual consumption over their late working careers and retirement. 
A second lesson of the crisis is that it is even harder for ordinary human beings, as 
opposed to optimal planners, to make this kind of decision and then stick to it.  Unlike optimal 
planners, ordinary humans face problems of self control when trying to devise and follow 
through on a long-term saving plan.  Mandatory saving, either in private or public pension plans, 
can help solve the self-control problem.  In contrast to most public pension plans, many private 
plans put decisions about portfolio allocation in the hands of individual workers.  Most humans 
have only a rudimentary grasp of basic financial economics, however.  They may be aware that 
some kinds of investments, like corporate equities, are subject to greater price fluctuation 
compared with other assets, like bank deposits and short-duration bonds.  But most workers are 
probably unaware of differences across asset classes in expected rates of return over 20- or 40-  - 2 -
year investment horizons.  Furthermore, their investment decisions may be excessively 
influenced by the recent trailing returns of different asset classes. 
The behavior of professional investment managers is better informed and more 
disciplined than that of ordinary humans.  Recent financial history reminds us of a third lesson, 
however.  The decisions of professional managers are also subject to serious error, including 
many kinds of error identical to those committed by ordinary humans.  When investment 
professionals manage assets owned by other, less sophisticated investors, their behavior is 
naturally affected by self interest. If investment professionals have an outsize influence in 
determining their own compensation contracts, the contracts will frequently reward investment 
behavior that is not in the best interest of investors.  Of course, far-sighted and well-informed 
investors will reject such contracts and seek out managers offering compensation terms that 
closely align the interests of managers and investors.  Unfortunately, far-sighted, well-informed 
investors are greatly outnumbered by ordinary humans (see lesson #2 above).  Ordinary humans 
typically place their savings in the hands of investment managers who receive compensation 
under performance contracts that reward them for short-term performance but fail to penalize 
them when short-term gains are later reversed by large-scale losses.  The asymmetry of this 
reward structure is advantageous for investment managers but not in the interests of people 
whose funds are invested. 
These lessons of the financial crisis have direct implications for the role and regulation of 
private, worker-controlled retirement investment accounts in a nation’s pension system.  Such 
pensions have important advantages, as has been noted by advocates of social security 
privatization.  The buildup of funds in individual retirement accounts can boost private and 
national saving.  For most workers the relationship between contributions and ultimate 
retirement benefits is much more transparent in the case of individually owned investment 
accounts than it is in traditional public pension systems.  The transparency and simplicity of the 
relationship between contributions and benefits may reduce the labor supply distortions induced 
by a pension system.    
The financial crisis reminds us, however, that the pensions payable under a private 
investment account system are highly variable from one year to the next unless workers invest in 
a very conservative portfolio.  Optimistic estimates of workers’ expected returns under private 
retirement accounts almost always assume that workers hold a sizeable percentage of their   - 3 -
portfolios in risky assets.  If they make this investment choice their pensions will be very 
unpredictable even under optimistic assumptions about their self-discipline in maintaining a 
consistent and prudent investment strategy.  Recent evidence suggests that many if not most 
worker-investors are far less well-informed and self-disciplined than assumed in the standard 
economic model, which implies that the risk-adjusted returns actually obtained by workers will 
fall short of the theoretical returns implied by standard financial theory.  The assumption that 
fund managers acting as agents of the worker-investors will act solely in the interests of 
retirement savers is hard to reconcile with the actual behavior of fund managers (Bebchuk and 
Fried 2003 and Bebchuk 2009).  This is another reason that unregulated or lightly regulated 
retirement investment accounts can produce risk-adjusted returns that are well below returns that 
are implied by financial market history. 
In the remainder of the paper I briefly describe some of the recent debate over social 
security privatization and consider in detail the historical evidence on the variability of pensions 
financed out of individual investment accounts.  This evidence is based on observed returns on 
major U.S. asset classes over the period from 1872 through 2008.  In other papers I have 
considered the variability of returns in individual account pensions for worker-investors in other 
industrial countries (Burtless 2003 and 2007). On the whole, the variability of hypothetical 
pensions is lower for workers in the United States than it is for workers in other industrialized 
countries.  The policy implications of these results therefore also extend to most other industrial 
countries.  I next consider evidence on the actual financial knowledge and investment behavior 
of retirement savers.  The paper ends with a short discussion of policy implications for national 
pension design. 
I.  Background 
The goals of a national pension system are to assure secure and adequate incomes to 
workers whose earnings have been reduced as a result of invalidity or old age and to assure 
adequate incomes to the surviving dependents of deceased workers.  Economists emphasize that 
these goals should be achieved through programs that are affordable and that preserve incentives 
for able-bodied people to work throughout their careers.  Some also stress that the programs 
should not interfere with the goal of maintaining adequate national saving.  In recent years 
governments and international organizations have focused on designing or reforming national 
pension systems so they can be kept affordable in the long run.     - 4 -
For many rich and middle-income countries, population aging is a major stimulus for 
reform.  The projected budget costs associated with population aging are so large that 
governments have been or will be forced to make major changes in the structure of their pension 
systems.  In the past two decades policymakers in a number of rich countries have shown interest 
in following the example of Chile, which replaced its public, pay-as-you-go pension system with 
a private system organized around individual investment accounts.  Advocates of this kind of 
reform point to Chile's success in introducing a private account system to replace a failing and 
under-funded public system, a system the government began phasing out in the early 1980s.  In 
the past three decades, Chile’s private pension system has received high marks for sound 
administration, good returns, and broad political acceptance.  (It has, however, received lower 
marks because of major holes in workforce coverage.)  The expected surge in public retirement 
costs in rich industrialized countries has made many economists and some policymakers 
receptive to the idea of a Chilean-style private substitute or supplement to existing unfunded 
public systems. 
The World Bank spurred interest in this kind of reform in the early 1990s when it 
published Averting the Old Age Crisis (World Bank 1994).  The book advocated a three-pillar 
national pension system.  The first proposed pillar would provide basic, defined-benefit (DB) 
pensions, funded out of current payroll or income taxes, and it would assure minimally adequate 
incomes to the covered population.  This component of the system would be mandatory and 
publicly managed.  A second mandatory but privately managed system would collect earnings-
related contributions from the covered workforce and deposit them in individual, defined-
contribution (DC) pension accounts.  The accounts would be publicly regulated but privately 
managed.  Pensions financed out of the accounts would be fully funded, possibly contributing in 
the early years of reform to a higher national saving rate.  The third pillar of the suggested 
system would provide workers with a structured vehicle for retirement savings in addition to the 
savings mandated by the first two pillars of the system.  This component would be voluntary and 
privately managed.  The first pillar of the system would be explicitly redistributive in favor of 
the poor and other disadvantaged groups, and the first two pillars of the system would provide 
critical lifecycle insurance to workers and their dependents.  In many, though not all, rich 
countries adoption of the three-pillar system recommended by the World Bank would entail a 
substantial shift toward a more funded and more privately managed social security system.     - 5 -
In 2001 the World Bank published a second volume on national pension systems entitled 
New Ideas about Old Age Security (Holzmann and Stiglitz 2001).  This volume reconsidered and 
extended the analysis in Averting the Old Age Crisis.  The leading chapter, by Peter Orszag and 
Joseph Stiglitz, argues against the idea that a privately managed, defined-contribution pension 
program is the most sensible way to organize the funded portion of a national pension system 
(Orszag and Stiglitz 2001).  A key point of their analysis is that many of the supposed 
advantages of private, defined-contribution pensions over public systems are based on unrealistic 
comparisons between an ideal, efficiently managed private system and existing public retirement 
programs.  This kind of comparison sheds no light on the inherent advantages and disadvantages 
of the two kinds of system.  If a private, defined-contribution system were actually implemented, 
it would fall short of the ideal envisioned by proponents.  Similarly, the shortcomings of existing 
public, defined-benefit retirement programs are not necessarily inherent in such systems.   
Instead, they might be the result of policy mistakes that can be easily remedied.   
Proponents of defined-contribution pensions frequently argue, for example, that such 
pensions provide superior labor supply incentives, because they do not distort the marginal 
relationship between a worker’s pension contributions, on the one hand, and expected pension 
benefits, on the other.  This claim depends crucially on the returns workers expect to obtain on 
their pension contributions.  In countries with imperfect capital markets, it is conceivable that 
workers assign very low probability to their chances of obtaining positive or even zero returns on 
their DC pension contributions.  In extreme cases, their contributions may be viewed as 
equivalent to a pure tax on earnings.   In most existing public, defined-benefit systems, there is a 
gap between workers’ marginal contribution and the marginal gain they can expect in the form of 
higher future benefits.  This gap is not inherent in DB plans, however, since benefit formulas can 
be reformed to strengthen the link between contributions and expected future pensions. 
II.  Variable returns and funded pensions 
The financial crisis has reminded many workers of the uncertainty of returns on private 
savings.  Workers whose retirement savings were mainly invested in corporate equities, real 
estate, or corporate bonds have sustained heavy losses over the past year.  In most countries, 
stock market losses have exceeded 35 percent of the investor’s holdings at the start of last year.  
In some countries, losses in major asset classes have exceeded 50 percent.  The effect of these 
kinds of losses on labor supply incentives is not always easy to assess.  The wealth losses will   - 6 -
almost certainly encourage later retirement among workers who had large DC wealth holdings 
when the crisis began.  On the other hand, workers who are compelled to make minimum annual 
contributions into a DC plan may scale back their assessment of the future payoff from such 
contributions.  It is hard to see how this reassessment of the value of mandated pension 
contributions has an effect that differs materially from the effect of increasing the tax on labor 
compensation.  The efficiency differences between contributions to DB and DC pension 
accounts, whether publicly or privately managed, are easy to exaggerate. 
The government can sponsor and manage either DB or DC plans, and both types of plan 
can be either funded or unfunded.  Typically, of course, governments offer unfunded DB plans.  
Similarly, private employers can offer their employees either DB or DC plans.  In the United 
States an important distinction between privately sponsored DB and DC plans is the identity of 
the party that bears the risk of asset market fluctuations.  If an employer offers a DB plan, the 
employer must pay promised benefits to covered workers, regardless of the returns on the 
pension fund’s portfolio.  Employers bear the risk of financial market fluctuations.  If an 
employer offers a DC plan, it is responsible for making promised contributions into each 
worker’s retirement account but it bears none of the risk of financial market fluctuations.  When 
investments held in a worker’s account earn poor returns, the worker will accumulate a small 
nest egg and obtain a small pension. 
Much of the public discussion of the U.S. financial crisis has focused on the misfortune 
of older workers enrolled in DC plans.  This is understandable, both because their problems are 
obvious and because well over half of private-sector employees in the U.S. who are enrolled in a 
private pension plan are covered solely by a company-sponsored DC plan.  Only 10% of enrolled 
private-sector workers are covered solely by a DB plan.  In the recent past, however, company-
sponsored DB plans were much more important.  In 1979, 62% of pension-covered private-
sector workers were enrolled solely in a DB plan and another 22% were enrolled in both DB and 
DC plans.  Even though private DB plans are now less important than they were in the past, they 
remain economically significant because they are offered by so many large, high-compensation 
employers.   
The recent financial market turmoil has exposed the risks of company DB plans, both to 
employers and to employees.  The future pension liabilities of such plans are funded under a 
variety of assumptions about average future returns in different asset classes, expected employee   - 7 -
tenure under the plan, and the life expectancy of pensioners.  When the trailing returns on plan 
assets are high, employers make small contributions or no contributions at all to their plans.  
When trailing returns are low, many plans face a serious underfunding problem.  Unfortunately, 
periods in which trailing returns are low tend to have two other characteristics:  Nominal bond 
yields are also low, and company bankruptcy rates are high.   When bond yields are low, the cost 
of purchasing annuities for newly retired workers is high.  DB pension plans need more funds 
per worker to pay for anticipated future liabilities.  Unfortunately, the level of assets in the fund 
has declined because recent returns on those assets have been low or negative.  The combination 
of low asset valuations and high annuity prices makes the firm liable for higher pension 
contributions, often at a time when economy-wide demand for its products is low.  Increased 
funding obligations for the DB plan may in fact help push the company into bankruptcy.  Since 
1974 the U.S. government has provided pension insurance to workers enrolled in company-
sponsored DB plans.  The insurance has important limitations, however.  Workers of bankrupt 
firms who are owed large pensions or who are younger than 65 may receive insurance coverage 
for only part of their promised pensions.  As this discussion shows, the financial market risks of 
corporate DB plans are shared in a very complicated way by sponsoring companies, their 
employees, and the government.  Since the division of risk is far from transparent, the impact of 
the financial crisis on DB pensions has received much less attention than the impact on workers 
who are enrolled in DC plans.  It seems likely, however, that the crisis will contribute to a further 
erosion in the popularity of company DB pension plans. 
It is worth reflecting on the reasons why one country – the United States – originally 
adopted a publicly managed retirement system in the 1930s.  The recent dive in stock prices and 
home values offers a reminder of why government-guaranteed pensions seemed like such a good 
idea in the Great Depression.  President Franklin Roosevelt proposed creation of social security 
in 1935, a bit more than five years after the stock market crash of October 1929. Between the end 
of 1928 and the end of 1932, U.S. stock market prices fell 71%. Even if we make allowances for 
reinvested dividend payments and the drop in the price level, the real value of the composite 
stock portfolio fell almost 55%.  The collapse of stock prices and the bankruptcy of thousands of 
farms, businesses, and banks wiped out the savings of millions of retirees and older workers. 
Many industrial and trade union pension plans became insolvent, leaving covered pensioners and 
older workers without a dependable source of old-age income. Given these shocks, it cannot be   - 8 -
surprising that the president, Congress, and most voters thought a public pension plan, backed by 




U.S. Stock Market Prices, 1950-2009:II
   Source:  Standard and Poors composite stock index.






















The current U.S. social security system covers a bigger percentage of the workforce and 
offers better income protection than the one established in the Great Depression. Like the 
original system, however, the current program provides workers with a reliable source of 
retirement income that is largely insulated from the risks of company bankruptcy and financial 
market turbulence.  The performance of capital markets in 2008 reminds us why voters in the 
1930s shifted their allegiance from private to public management of retirement savings.   
Between the end of 2007 and the end of 2008, the Standard and Poors composite stock index fell 
38.5%.  Including reinvested dividends and adjusting for the change in consumer prices, the total 
real return on U.S. stocks in 2008 was -37.1% (see Figure 1).  Newly retired workers who had 
invested all their savings in the stock market saw the purchasing power of their nest eggs shrink   - 9 -
by more than a third.  Americans who invested part of their savings in smaller capitalization 
stocks or in foreign equities did even worse.  About two-thirds of American households own the 
dwellings in which they live.  U.S. home prices started to fall in 2007, and the decline 
accelerated in 2008 (see Figure 2).  Many homeowners have sizeable mortgages on the homes 
they occupy, so the drop in their net home equity was, in percentage terms, much faster than the 
drop in home prices. 
Figure 2. 
 
Index of Real U.S. House Prices, 1975-2009:I
   Note:  Federal Housing Finance Agency index of U.S.-average house price deflated using GDP deflator.
   Sources:  Federal Housing Finance Agency and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
















Plunging stock prices and falling home values sharply reduced the net wealth of U.S. 
households (see Figure 3).  The ratio of household net worth to household disposable income fell 
from 6.4 in the second quarter of 2007 to 4.7 in the first quarter of 2009.  Although the current 
wealth-income ratio is not low by historical standards, the large losses in household wealth will 
have a profound effect on older workers and retirees who largely depend on private assets to 
support their retirement consumption.  The sharp drop in wealth will make it difficult for older 
workers to afford retirement and for current retirees to maintain their previous consumption.   - 10 -
In contrast to the performance of most private assets, the inflation-adjusted value of 
social security benefits was essentially unaffected by the 2008 financial crisis.  Social security 
pensions are not totally secure, of course.  If the U.S. Congress does not raise the contribution 
rate or scale back social security benefits sometime in the next 30 years, the reserves of the 
system will be depleted by about 2040. At that point social security pensions will have to be cut 
or contributions increased. If all of the adjustment takes the form of a benefit reduction, which is 
the outcome mandated by current law, monthly pensions will have to be cut about 22%. 
Figure 3. 
 
Ratio of Net Household Wealth to Household Disposable Income, 1952-2009:I
   Sources:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds 
















The long-run funding problem of social security is one reason critics argue for full or 
partial privatization of the system. In 2005 President George W. Bush urged Congress to adopt a 
reform plan that would allow U.S. workers to divert some of their social security contributions 
into private retirement accounts. The reform would have undercut social security funding 
because workers who opted into the new accounts would send smaller contributions to the 
existing system. Since social security’s revenue base would be smaller, Congress would   - 11 -
eventually be forced to reduce monthly pensions or make large transfers from the U.S. Treasury 
to assure that the system will not become insolvent. 
Individual account plans like the one proposed by President Bush differ from traditional 
social security in an obvious way. Each worker’s private retirement benefit depends solely on the 
size of the worker’s contributions and the success of the worker’s investment strategy. Workers 
who make bigger contributions and earn better returns on their savings will receive larger 
pensions than workers who contribute less and earn lower returns. In contrast, workers’ social 
security benefits depend on their average lifetime wages, their eligible dependents when they 
claim a pension, and the age at which a benefit is claimed. Workers who retire at the same age 
and with the same earnings records generally receive very similar benefits, regardless of the year 
in which they claim a pension or the current level of asset prices. 
A claimed advantage of individual retirement accounts is that they permit workers to earn 
a much higher rate of return than can be obtained on contributions to a fully mature, pay-as-you-
go public pension program. I have heard it claimed, for example, that workers can expect to earn 
negative rates of return on their contributions to social security, while they can earn 6% or more 
on their contributions to a private retirement account. The comparison is incorrect and seriously 
misleading.
1  Most U.S. workers can expect to obtain positive real returns on their contributions 
to social security. Over the next few decades, only a small fraction could obtain significantly 
higher returns if the U.S. public pension system were partly or fully privatized. 
Market fluctuations and the value of pensions.  A basic problem with individual 
retirement accounts was highlighted by the recent market turmoil. It is hard to predict how much 
retirement income will be produced by a private savings plan or DC pension account. The value 
of assets held in the account can fluctuate widely unless all the savings are held in very 
                                                 
1 Three problems make the comparison misleading. First, the claimed return on social security contributions is 
too low. Some American contributors will earn negative returns on their social security contributions, but on average 
future returns are expected to be between 1% and 1.5%, even if contributions must be raised or benefits reduced in 
order to eliminate the program’s funding shortfall. Second, workers will not have an opportunity to earn the stock 
market rate of return on all their retirement contributions, even if Congress establishes an individual account system. 
Workers’ overall rate of return on their contributions to the retirement system will be an average of the return 
obtained on their contributions to individual accounts and the return earned on their contributions to whatever 
remains of the traditional social security program. For most people who are currently at work or who will join the 
workforce in the next three decades, the combined rate of return will be much closer to the current return on social 
security contributions than it will be to 6%.  Finally, the claimed 6% return on stock market investments includes no 
adjustment for the large standard deviation around the expected return.  A meaningful comparison of returns would 
show risk-adjusted returns of the two kinds of contributions.  The return on stocks looks much less favorable under 
this kind of comparison.   - 12 -
conservative government-issued securities. Of course, if retirement savings are invested in very 
safe assets, workers cannot anticipate receiving a high rate of return. In July 2009, for example, 
the real annual yield on newly issued 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities was 1.92%. 
If these bonds are held for their full 10-year term, investors will receive a return on their 
investment that corresponds to the rate of consumer inflation plus a little less than 2%. Other 
kinds of savings instruments, like corporate stocks and bonds, offer higher expected returns, but 
they are not guaranteed to produce a positive or even a zero rate of return after adjusting for 
inflation. 
Figure 4. 
 Replacement rate obtained from personal account savings of workers who invest solely in 
stocks and contribute 4% of annual salary over a 40-year career
Replacement rate
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Source:  Author’s calculations as explained in text. 
 
All private investments and most public securities are subject to risk. Over long periods 
of time, investments in the U.S. stock market have outperformed other types of U.S. financial 
investments, including Treasury securities and corporate bonds. This explains financial advisors’ 
recommendation to young and middle-aged workers that they should hold much of their 
retirement savings in stocks. But as last year’s markets reminded us, stock returns are highly   - 13 -
variable from one year to the next. They are substantially more variable over short periods of 
time than are the returns on safer assets, like short-term Treasury securities and insured 
certificates of deposit. 
Many critics of traditional social security seem to believe the annual ups and downs in 
the stock market average out over time, assuring even the unluckiest investor a good return if he 
or she invests steadily over a full career. A moment’s reflection shows that this cannot be true. 
From the end of December 2007 to the end of December 2008, the value of the Standard and 
Poor’s composite stock index fell almost 39% after adjusting for changes in the U.S. price level. 
Shares purchased before December 2007 lost almost four-tenths their value in less than twelve 
months. For a worker who planned on retiring at the end of 2008, the drop in stock market prices 
would have required a drastic cut of planned retirement consumption if the worker’s sole source 
of income was derived from stock market investments. 
Figure 4 shows calculations of the pensions that workers could expect under an 
individual account plan using information about annual investment returns, interest rates, and 
inflation dating back to 1872. I start with the assumption that workers enter the workforce at age 
22 and work for forty years until reaching their 62nd birthdays. I also assume they contribute 4% 
of their wages each year to their individual retirement accounts. Wages typically rise through 
workers’ careers until they reach their early or mid fifties, and then earnings begin to fall. When 
workers reach age 62, I assume they use their retirement savings to purchase a single-life 
annuity. A standard measure of the value of an annuity is the replacement rate, which is simply 
the amount of the monthly annuity expressed as a percentage of the worker’s final wage.
2 
                                                 
2 I assume that the age profile of earnings in a given year matches the age profile of earnings for American men 
in 1995 as reported by the Census Bureau. In addition, I assume that average earnings in the economy as a whole 
grow 1.5% a year. While it would be interesting to see how workers’ pensions would vary if we altered the 
percentage of contributions invested in exotic assets, in my calculations I assume that all contributions are invested 
in some combination of U.S. stocks, long-term U.S. government bonds, and low-risk, short-term commercial paper 
or 6-month certificates of deposit. The total return calculation for stocks is based on the return for the Standard and 
Poor’s composite stock index; the total return calculation for bonds reflects the return on U.S. government debt with 
a maturity of at least ten years.  For years up through 1997 the total return on safe 6-month securities is based on the 
yield on commercial paper published by the Federal Reserve; for years after 1997, when the Federal Reserve series 
was discontinued, the safe short-term total return is calculated from the yield on 6-month certificates of deposit. 
Interest and dividend payments from the worker’s investment portfolio are immediately reinvested in the same 
security, and the worker’s portfolio is rebalanced at the end of every year to achieve a planned percentage 
distribution of stock, bond, and safe short-term investments.  I assume that workers incur no expenses buying, 
selling, or holding stocks, bonds, and safe short-term securities, which biases upward estimated rates of return. 
When workers reach their 62nd birthdays, they use their asset accumulations to purchase a single-life annuity for 
males. (Joint survivor annuities for a worker and a spouse would be about one-fifth lower than the ones shown in the 
charts.) To determine the annuity company’s charge for the annuity, I use the Social Security Actuary’s projected-  - 14 -
Figure 4 shows replacement rates for workers who invest all their retirement savings in 
U.S. equities. I track replacement rates for workers retiring at the end of successive years from 
1911 through 2008.  The hypothetical experiences of ninety-eight workers are shown in the 
chart. The worker who entered the workforce in 1872 and retired at the end of 1911, for example, 
would have accumulated enough savings in his individual retirement account to buy an annuity 
that replaced 28% of his peak lifetime earnings (that is, his average earnings between ages 54 
and 58). The worker who entered the workforce in 1967 and retired at the end of 2006 could 
have purchased an annuity that replaced 50% of his peak earnings. The highest replacement rate 
(89%) was obtained by a worker who entered the workforce at the start of 1960 and retired at the 
end of 1999. The lowest (12%) was obtained by a worker who began to work in 1881 and retired 
in 1920. Nine-tenths of the replacement rates shown in the chart fall in the range between 16% 
and 75%. The average replacement rate is 40%. For workers retiring after 1945, the replacement 
rate has averaged 49%. 
The main lesson to be drawn from the chart is that individual retirement accounts 
invested solely in the stock market offer a very shaky foundation for a secure retirement income. 
Workers with the good fortune to retire when stock prices are high obtain big pensions, while 
workers with the bad luck to retire after a market crash can be left with a very meager retirement 
income. The largest pension shown in the chart is more than seven times bigger than the smallest 
one. Even in the years since 1960, the experiences of retiring workers have differed dramatically. 
The biggest pension was almost four times the size of the smallest one. In the six years from 
1968 to 1974, the replacement rate fell fifty-one percentage points, plunging from 83% to 32%. 
In the six years from 1993 to 1999, it jumped fifty-one percentage points, soaring from 38% to 
89%. In the twelve months from December 2007 to December 2008, the predicted replacement 
rate dropped eighteen percentage points, falling from 45% to 23%, the smallest replacement rate 
in more than fifty years.  
                                                                                                                                                             
life table for males reaching age 65 in 1995. The annuity company is assumed to invest solely in long-term U.S. 
government bonds, so when it determines the price of an annuity, it uses the current yield on long-term government 
bonds. I assume that the annuity company sells a fair annuity. It does not earn a profit, incur administrative or selling 
costs, or impose extra charges to protect itself against the risk of adverse selection in its customer pool. These 
assumptions are unrealistic. Annuity companies typically charge an amount that is between 10% and 15% of the 
selling price of annuities to cover these items. My assumptions therefore yield an overly optimistic estimate of the 
pension that each worker would receive. For a more detailed explanation of the calculations, see Burtless (2003).   - 15 -
U.S. social security pensions have been far more predictable and have varied within a much 
narrower range. The Social Security Actuary estimates that workers with an average lifetime 
earnings profile will receive an inflation-adjusted monthly pension that replaces 42% to 46% of 
their late-career earnings. Workers with lower-than-average earnings receive higher replacement 
rates (Clingman, Nichols, and Chaplain 2008, p. 3). Compared with most forms of private 
savings, traditional social security provides a more predictable basis for retirement planning and 
a much more reliable foundation for basic retirement income 
Strategies to reduce retirement income risk.  The calculations shown in figure 4 refer to 
the experiences of workers who consistently invest 4% of their wages in U.S. equities. This 
investment strategy has on average yielded the best pension available to most U.S. workers. 
Workers who do not want to accept the risks of equity investment can put some or all of their 
savings in less risky assets, such as corporate or U.S. Treasury bonds or very safe short-term 
securities. Figure 5 shows replacement rates when workers invest part or all of their retirement 
savings in U.S. government bonds. Under one of the alternative investment strategies, workers 
place half their savings in long-term government bonds and the other half in stocks. Under the 
less risky strategy, they invest all their savings in government bonds. 
As can be seen in the chart, workers who choose a less risky investment strategy will 
experience less variability in replacement rates. Between 1999 and 2002, workers who invested 
everything in stocks saw replacement rates fall 53 percentage points, while workers who invested 
half their savings in bonds saw replacement rates fall only 18 percentage points. Those who 
invested all their savings in bonds saw the replacement rate fall just 0.1 percentage point. Of 
course, workers who opt for a low-risk investment strategy will also receive a lower replacement 
rate on average than they would obtain if they invested all their savings in equities. Whereas the 
average replacement rate under a 100% stock investment strategy is 40%, the average under the 
50% stock / 50% bond strategy is only 24%. Under the 100% government bond strategy, the 
average is just 14%. Figure 5 emphasizes the trade-off workers face between good returns on 
their retirement savings and uncertainty over the value of their nest eggs as they approach 
retirement. A worker’s retirement income is more predictable and less risky if funds are invested 
solely or mainly in very safe assets, but retirement income is almost certain to be considerably 
lower. In many years, workers who adopted the low-risk investment strategy obtained a much   - 16 -
lower real rate of return on their individual account savings than they would have obtained on 
U.S. social security contributions. 
Figure 5. 
 Replacement rate obtained from personal account savings of workers who invest in 
alternative portfolios and contribute 4% of annual salary over a 40-year career
Replacement rate
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Source:  Author’s calculations as explained in text. 
Besides investing in very safe assets, there are a couple of other strategies DC-covered 
workers can follow to reduce the uncertainty of their retirement incomes.  One strategy is to 
begin purchasing annuities before reaching retirement and to buy a sequence of annuities over a 
number of years.  This reduces the risk that all of the worker’s funds will be converted to 
annuities when asset prices are exceptionally low or annuity prices are exceptionally high.  In an 
earlier paper, I looked at the success of this strategy in reducing the variability of workers’ initial 
replacement rates (Burtless 2002).  Workers who purchased annuities in annual installments 
beginning five years before retirement were able to reduce the standard deviation of initial 
replacement rates by about one-sixth compared with workers who converted all of their savings 
at retirement.  For workers who invest heavily in stocks before converting to an annuity, this   - 17 -
strategy also reduces the expected return on lifetime savings, because assets are held as relatively 
safe, low-return annuities for a greater percentage of the worker’s career. 
Another investment strategy, popularized by financial advisors and mutual fund 
companies, is to shift gradually from a portfolio that is dominated by high-risk, high-return assets 
early in a career to a portfolio that is dominated by low-risk, low-return assets near the age of 
expected retirement (Canner, Mankiw, and Weil 1997).  Judging by the portfolio descriptions 
provided by mutual fund companies, there is no agreement on how this portfolio shift should be 
accomplished.  Figure 6 shows the portfolio allocation to equities (foreign and domestic) in six 
target-retirement-date funds, with the percent allocation plotted as a function of the number of 
years until a worker’s expected retirement age.  The average allocation in the six funds is 
indicated in the chart, as are the allocations in two funds with major differences in portfolio 
allocations.  All the fund managers agree that equities should account for a declining percentage 
of worker assets as retirement approaches, but they do not agree on the starting and ending 
allocations or the rate at which equity investments should be exchanged for safe assets. 
Figure 6. 
 Percent of portfolio allocated to domestic and international 
equities, by years to retirement, in six target-date mutual funds
  Sources:  Author's calculations based on mutual fund descriptions provided by American Century, American Funds, 
Fidelity Funds, Putnam, TIAA-CREF, T. Rowe Price, and Vanguard.
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Robert Shiller has also proposed a life-cycle portfolio allocation for retirement savers 
(Shiller 2005).  Under his proposal workers below age 29 would invest 85% of their savings in 
equities and this percentage would fall steadily to 15% of the portfolio by age 60.  The remainder 
of the portfolio would be invested equally in long government bonds and safe commercial short-
term securities.  Given the heavy allocation to safe assets, the Shiller portfolio exposes retirement 
savers to less risk than the target-date portfolios favored by most mutual fund companies.  Figure 
7 compares the historical replacement rates that would have been obtained under the Shiller 
target-date portfolio with the replacement rates obtainable under a 50-50 stock-bond portfolio.  
The proposed Shiller portfolio produces less variation in replacement rates, though much of the 
reduction in variance occurs because the portfolio is less likely to produce very high replacement 
rates. 
Figure 7. 
 Replacement rates obtained from personal account savings of workers who invest in two 
moderate-risk portfolios, workers retiring in 1911-2008
Replacement rate
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  Source:  Author’s calculations as explained in text. 
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Figure 8. 
Average replacement rate (98 hypothetical workers)
Standard deviation of replacement rates (98 hypothetical workers)
Mean and standard deviation of replacement rates obtained under alternative investment 




































   Note:   Replacement rates calculated at assumed retirement age (62) for 98 hypothetical workers retiring at the end 
of 1911-2008. The assumed contribution rate is 4% of each worker’s annual salary. 
   Source:  Author’s calculations as explained in text.   - 20 -
The mean and standard deviation of pension replacement rates under alternative 
investment strategies are displayed in Figure 8.  Not surprisingly, both the mean and the standard 
deviation are highest under an investment strategy that places 100% of the portfolio in U.S. 
equities.  The lowest expected replacement rate and standard deviation are obtained under an 
investment strategy that places 100% of assets in long government bonds. The reduced 
variability of pension outcomes is obtained at considerable cost, however.  The average 
replacement rate under a 100% bond investment strategy is almost two-thirds lower than the 
mean replacement rate when all retirement savings are invested in stocks.  The other two 
portfolios show considerably less variability in replacement rates than the all-stock investment 
strategy.  The target-age portfolio recommended by Shiller yields only slightly more variability 
than the all-bond portfolio, yet the mean replacement rate is more than half again larger than the 
average replacement rate under the all-bond investment strategy.  Thus, in comparison with the 
all-bond portfolio, the Shiller investment strategy has a major advantage.   
It is interesting to compare the impacts of recent stock market downturns on replacement 
rates under the four investment strategies.  Table 1 shows how replacement rates differed for 
workers retiring in four recent years, 1999, 2002, 2007, and 2008.  The first and third of these 
years represent the peaks of recent bull markets; the second and fourth years show the aftermath 
of a market crash.  For workers investing half or all of their late-career savings in the stock 
market, the equity price decline brought sharp declines in expected pensions.  Workers who 
invested all of their savings in long government bonds were almost unaffected by the market 
turmoil.   
The uncertainty of private account pensions is understated in the replacement rate charts. 
The calculations do not take account of the effects of inflation in the years after a worker retires. 
In periods of high inflation, such as the 1940s, the 1970s, and the early 1980s, U.S. inflation was 
high and erratic. Social security benefits are adjusted upward to reflect changes in prices, sparing 
pensioners from the adverse effects of unexpected inflation. Workers with private pensions or 
annuities do not receive this kind of inflation protection. As a result, private pensioners 
experience big drops in the purchasing power of their annuities when prices rise unexpectedly.  
Although a number of countries make inflation-protected annuities available to private investors, 
such annuities are still difficult or impossible to obtain in most countries, including the United 
States.   - 21 -
Table 1. 
Replacement rates before and after recent stock market 
declines under alternative investment strategies 
     
  Percent of worker’s average earnings between ages 54 and 58 












1999  89.1 49.6 32.9 25.4 
2002  36.2 32.2 27.8 25.2 
Difference  -52.9 -17.3 -5.1 -0.1 
  
   
   
2007  44.8 34.0 27.8 22.8 
2008  22.8 25.3 24.3 22.6 
Difference  -22.0 -8.7 -3.5 -0.2 
  
  
  Source:  Author's calculations as explained in text.   
 
III.  Investor psychology 
Investor psychology poses a second kind of risk that is not reflected in the charts. All the 
calculations are based on the assumption that workers follow a disciplined and consistent 
investment strategy throughout their careers. Research shows that many ordinary investors are 
neither consistent nor disciplined in their portfolio choices. They over-invest in assets that have 
performed strongly in the recent past, and they sell assets after a persistent or sharp fall in prices. 
These tendencies mean that many ordinary investors are inclined to buy assets when their price is 
high and sell them after their price has declined. Workers who make this kind of investment 
mistake will earn lower returns than the returns shown in the charts. The risk that workers might 
choose a bad investment strategy does not arise in current social security programs. Public social 
security provides a minimally adequate pension for nearly all workers who make contributions 
over a full career, regardless of the worker’s investment expertise.  
A retirement system that relies on workers to make their own decisions about retirement 
saving and investment would work well if workers make these decisions competently. The policy 
is riskier when a large fraction of workers bases saving and investment decisions on incomplete 
or faulty information, short time horizons, and bad reasoning. Private DC pension plans may   - 22 -
require workers to assume more responsibility to save for retirement and to plan the timing of 
asset withdrawal after they retire.  Nearly all such retirement plans require workers to allocate 
their pension savings across different investment options. If a nation relies heavily on worker-
directed and privately managed DC accounts, it should be confident that most workers will make 
good decisions. Serious planning errors, either when the worker is employed or after she retires, 
can lead to serious hardship if the worker’s error is a big one.  By the time a retired worker 
discovers she has saved too little or has invested unwisely, she may have little opportunity to 
undo the mistake by increasing her saving rate, changing her portfolio, or going back to work. 
Workers who elect or are required to set aside part of their wages in a private retirement 
account must ordinarily decide how to invest their savings. How good a job do they do?  All 
analyses of investor behavior in employer-sponsored DC pension plans show that American 
workers trade very little, almost certainly too little. Few 401(k) participants exchange one kind of 
asset for another, and it is uncommon for workers to reallocate their new contributions among 
the investment alternatives available to them (Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén 2003; and Ameriks 
and Zeldes 2004).  In a 10-year panel of observations in a large DC pension fund, Ameriks and 
Zeldes found that only 53% of workers made any change in their allocation of new contributions 
and only 27% made a change to the allocation of assets already held in their accounts. This 
means that most workers’ portfolio allocations change over time in response to realized returns 
on the different assets held in their portfolios. For example, workers who consistently allocate 
half of their new contributions to a diversified equity fund and half to a bond fund will see the 
stock-bond allocation of their portfolio vary widely over time if the relative returns on stocks and 
bonds differ. In the 1990s, stock returns were much higher than bond returns, so savers who 
failed to rebalance their portfolios ended the decade with a much higher proportion of their 
savings in stocks  and a much smaller proportion in bonds. Most investment advisors recommend 
that savers rebalance their portfolios about once a year in order to maintain the risk profile of 
their holdings, but very few retirement savers follow this advice.  All of the replacement rate 
calculations in Figures 4 – 8 assume workers consistently rebalance their portfolios.  Those who 
do not rebalance usually face unnecessary volatility in the lifetime returns on their portfolio. 
A serious problem for most worker investors is lack of financial knowledge. A 1995 
survey of U.S. mutual fund purchasers found that more than one-quarter were unaware that it is 
possible to lose money on investments held in a bond mutual fund. Only a minority of investors   - 23 -
reported knowing the cost of owning the mutual funds in their portfolio. An even smaller 
percentage knew that higher fund expenses were likely to reduce investors’ net returns. About 
one investor in five thought higher fund expenses would actually boost net returns (Alexander, 
Jones, and Nigro 1998). Economists have found considerable evidence that workers who are not 
financially literate are much less likely to invest in stocks (van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2007). 
Unlike the well-informed and fully rational saver imagined in standard economics, many actual 
savers do not take the trouble to become informed about the pros and cons of different kinds of 
investments, though the payoff from doing so would be substantial. Poorly informed savers 
invest little or none of their retirement savings in equities and other risky assets, even though 
nearly all economists and financial planners think such investments should receive at least some 
weight in a sensible retirement portfolio. 
Several findings about worker investment behavior raise questions about their capacity to 
align their portfolios with their long-term goals. Many workers allocate too much of their 
retirement savings to a single stock, and to a particularly risky one. An investment option open to 
many U.S. retirement savers is stock in the company where they work. According to Schlomo 
Benartzi (2001), about a quarter of American workers’ discretionary retirement savings is 
invested in the stock of their employers. Many individual workers invest all or nearly all of their 
pension savings in their employer’s stock. From the point of view of risk management, this is a 
dubious savings strategy. First, the risk of owning a single stock is much greater than that of 
holding a diversified portfolio, such as that offered by an equity mutual fund. Second, the future 
performance of an employer’s stock is likely to be positively correlated with the worker’s wage 
earnings. If a worker is laid off because his employer falls on hard times, the employer’s share 
price will probably decline at the same time. It is hard to understand why financially savvy 
workers would want to compound the misfortune of job loss by losing most of their retirement 
savings at the same time. 
Many workers show little evidence they have carefully weighed their investment options 
or made knowledgeable decisions about their saving allocation. A sizeable percentage of workers 
leaves contributions in the default investment option under their employer retirement plan (Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian 2004). It is not credible that the funds are left untouched because the 
default allocation corresponds to the worker’s optimal choice. Workers are equally likely to 
remain in the default option investment plan, regardless of whether it is a low-risk money market   - 24 -
fund or a moderate-risk stock-bond hybrid fund. The risk-expected return characteristics of the 
two investment options are very different, so workers’ persistence in remaining in the default 
option is explained by inertia or lack of knowledge rather than by the happy coincidence of 
worker preferences and the risk characteristics of the default option. 
  Finally, many investors are excessively swayed by the packaging of the investment 
choices offered to them. In principle, well-informed investors should select a portfolio of assets 
because its risk and expected return characteristics correspond closely to those they desire. In 
practice, some investors will prefer to invest in option B if it is presented as an intermediate 
alternative between options A and C, but will instead choose option C when it is presented as the 
intermediate alternative between options B and D. If options B and C are both available on 
different menus of investment alternatives, investors should always prefer B over C or C over B, 
regardless of the risk and return characteristics of the other investment options on the menu. 
Careful experiments by Benartzi and Thaler (2002) show, however, that some workers’ 
preferences are decisively affected by extreme and intermediate alternatives that are offered on 
the menu. Workers who know little about investment are apparently guided in their portfolio 
allocation by factors that should be irrelevant to their decision. 
Many proposals to privatize social security rest on the theory that workers will make 
informed and sensible choices if offered complete freedom to choose their retirement age, saving 
rate, and investment strategy. Under this assumption, popular with professors of economics and 
finance, workers select their retirement age and lifetime saving plan based on a farsighted 
evaluation of the potential risks and rewards of different retirement and saving options. This 
assumption is probably valid for some workers but is unlikely to be true for most of them. Many 
observers, including a few economists, are skeptical that workers think about retirement and 
savings in the farsighted and logical way just described. One reason that governments require 
workers to participate in social security, that companies provide pensions to their employees, and 
that unions pressure employers for more generous pensions is lack of confidence that workers 
will make sensible provision for old age on their own. The basic rationale for compulsory 
employer and government pensions is that it is better to organize retirement saving collectively 
and paternalistically rather than to rely on the unaided efforts of individual workers.   - 25 -
IV.  Policy implications 
A traditional defined-benefit pension helps solve a number of problems that most workers 
face as they prepare for retirement. First, the plan automatically sets aside a portion of current 
compensation as savings for retirement. Money in the account only becomes available when the 
worker is old or retired. Workers do not have to rely on their own judgment to select a retirement 
saving rate, nor do they have to rely on self-discipline to stick with the saving plan they adopt. 
Second, the money set aside in the retirement plan is managed by specialists who are 
knowledgeable about investing. Workers are not asked to rely on their own investment expertise, 
which may be limited. At least part of the investment risk is borne by employers or the 
government, reducing the variability of pensions that workers can expect to receive.  Third, when 
workers reach the end of their careers, their retirement nest eggs are converted into monthly 
annuity payments that last for the remainder of their lives. Workers do not need to worry about 
living too long or spending their nest egg so quickly that they exhaust their retirement savings 
before they die. 
A mandatory private DC pension solves one the three problems just mentioned by 
requiring workers to contribute a fraction of wages to a pension fund. If the mandatory pension 
also includes a provision requiring workers to convert their pension nest eggs to an annuity upon 
retirement it may solve a second problem as well.  Workers will not have to worry about out-
living their retirement savings.  Workers are still left with the problem of highly uncertain 
pensions.  They can of course adopt a very conservative investment strategy.  Their pensions will 
be less variable but their expected rate of return on contributions will be much lower than they 
could have obtained under a collective retirement system, one in which investment risks are 
broadly shared across workers and taxpayers in several generations.   
When workers in a DC plan are offered a variety of investment options in which to invest 
their savings, well-informed workers can in theory benefit by selecting an investment strategy 
that is closely aligned to their attitude toward expected return and risk.  The question is, how 
large a percentage of workers is well-informed and disciplined?  Optimists believe the 
percentage is high, and they are therefore more inclined to support a large role for publicly 
regulated but privately managed and worker-directed DC pension accounts.  Pessimists are 
skeptical whether a large percentage of workers is competent to manage their own retirement   - 26 -
savings.  They are more inclined to favor public management or strong public regulation of 
investment choices and pension fund administration.   
Last year’s financial market turbulence should have reminded both policymakers and 
workers of the fact that even conservative investment strategies offer little assurance workers 
will reach old age with enough assets to pay for a comfortable retirement.  To some degree the 
risks facing workers can be reduced through better financial education and the development of 
new retirement investment products.  Although proponents of individual accounts continue to be 
confident that workers can purchase safe assets that will yield high rates of return, recent 
experience suggests that neither the value of financial assets nor their real return is predictable 
enough to assure a comfortable retirement income.  Workers who follow identical investment 
strategies but who retire a few years apart can receive pensions that are startlingly unequal.  By 
diversifying risks across generations and across different sources of pension funding, a sensibly 
designed public pension system can sharply reduce some of the risks inherent in a mainly 
private, capital-funded retirement system.   - 27 -
References 
Agnew, J., Balduzzi, P., and Sundén, A.E. 2003. “Portfolio Choice, Trading, and Returns in a 
Large 401(k) Plan.” American Economic Review 93(1) (March): 193–215. 
Alexander, G. J., Jones, J. D., and Nigro, P. J. (1998)  “Mutual Fund Shareholders: 
Characteristics, Investor Knowledge, and Sources of Information.” Financial Services 
Review, 7: 301–316. 
Ameriks, J., and Zeldes, S.P. 2004. “How Do Household Portfolio Shares Vary with Age?” 
Working paper. New York:  Columbia University Graduate School of Business. 
Bebchuk, Lucian A. 2009. “Testimony on Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk,” 
Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives (June 11). 
Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse Fried. 2003. “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 17( 3): 71-92.  
Benartzi, S. 2001. “Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to Company 
Stock.” Journal of Finance 56(5), 1747-64. 
Benartzi, S., and Thaler, R.H. 2002. “How Much is Investor Autonomy Worth?” Journal of 
Finance 57(4): 1593-1616. 
Burtless, Gary.  2002.  “Social Security Privatization and Financial Market Risk: Lessons from 
U.S. Financial History,” T. Ihori and T. Tachibanaki, Social Security Reform in Advanced 
Countries.  London and New York:  Routledge. 
________. 2003. “What Do We Know about the Risk of Individual Account Pensions?  Evidence 
from Industrial Countries.” American Economic Review 93(2) (May): 354-59. 
________. 2007. “International Investment for Retirement Savers: Historical Evidence on Risk 
and Returns,” Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Working Paper 2007-5  
Chestnut Hill, MA:  Boston College. 
Canner, Niko, N. Gregory Mankiw, and David Weil. 1997. “An Asset Allocation Puzzle,” 
American Economic Review 87(1) (March): 181-191. 
Choi, J.J., Laibson, D., and Madrian, B.C. 2004. “Plan Design and 401(k) Savings Outcomes.” 
National Tax Journal 57 (June): 275-98. 
Clingman, Michael, Orlo Nichols, and Chris Chaplain.  2008. Illustrative Benefits for Retired 
Workers, Disabled Workers, and Survivors Scheduled Under Current Law.  Actuarial 
Note.  Baltimore, MD:  Office of the Chief Actuary, U.S. Social Security Administration. 
Holzmann, Robert and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.). 2001. New Ideas about Old Age Security: 
Toward  Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Orszag, Peter R., and Joseph E. Stiglitz.  2001.  “Rethinking Pension Reform:  Ten Myths about 
Social Security Systems.” In Robert Holtzman and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.). New Ideas 
about Old Age Security: Toward  Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.   - 28 -
Shiller, Robert J. 2005. “The Life-Cycle Personal Accounts Proposal for Social Security: An 
Evaluation.” NBER Working Paper No. 11300.  Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
van Rooij, M., Lusardi, A., and Alessie, R. 2007. "Financial Literacy and Stock Market 
Participation." NBER Working Paper 13565.  Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
World Bank. 1994. Averting the Old-Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote 
Growth.  New York: Oxford University Press. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2673 Vivek Ghosal, Business Strategy and Firm Reorganization under Changing Market 
Conditions, June 2009 
 
2674 Francesco Menoncin and Paolo M. Panteghini, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation in 
the Real World, June 2009 
 
2675 Thomas Hemmelgarn and Gaёtan Nicodème, Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing 
the First Years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive, June 2009 
 
2676 Oliver Himmler, The Effects of School Competition on Academic Achievement and 
Grading Standards, June 2009 
 
2677 Rolf Golombek and Michael Hoel, International Cooperation on Climate-Friendly 
Technologies, June 2009 
 
2678 Martin Cave and Matthew Corkery, Regulation and Barriers to Trade in 
Telecommunications Services in the European Union, June 2009 
 
2679 Costas Arkolakis, A Unified Theory of Firm Selection and Growth, June 2009 
 
2680 Michelle R. Garfinkel, Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Syropoulos, International 
Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly 
Determined, June 2009 
 
2681 Marcelo Resende, Capital Structure and Regulation in U.S. Local Telephony: An 
Exploratory Econometric Study; June 2009 
 
2682 Marc Gronwald and Janina Ketterer, Evaluating Emission Trading as a Policy Tool – 
Evidence from Conditional Jump Models, June 2009 
 
2683 Stephan O. Hornig, Horst Rottmann and Rüdiger Wapler, Information Asymmetry, 
Education Signals and the Case of Ethnic and Native Germans, June 2009 
 
2684 Benoit Dostie and Rajshri Jayaraman, The Effect of Adversity on Process Innovations 
and Managerial Incentives, June 2009 
 
2685 Peter Egger, Christian Keuschnigg and Hannes Winner, Incorporation and Taxation: 
Theory and Firm-level Evidence, June 2009 
 
2686 Chrysovalantou Milliou and Emmanuel Petrakis, Timing of Technology Adoption and 
Product Market Competition, June 2009 
 
2687 Hans Degryse, Frank de Jong and Jérémie Lefebvre, An Empirical Analysis of Legal 
Insider Trading in the Netherlands, June 2009 
  
2688 Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock and Roman M. Sheremeta, An Experimental 
Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games, June 2009 
 
2689 Alexander Chudik, M. Hashem Pesaran and Elisa Tosetti, Weak and Strong Cross 
Section Dependence and Estimation of Large Panels, June 2009 
 
2690 Mohamed El Hedi Arouri and Christophe Rault, On the Influence of Oil Prices on Stock 
Markets: Evidence from Panel Analysis in GCC Countries, June 2009 
 
2691 Lars P. Feld and Christoph A. Schaltegger, Political Stability and Fiscal Policy – Time 
Series Evidence for the Swiss Federal Level since 1849, June 2009 
 
2692 Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald, A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual 
Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth, June 2009 
 
2693 Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann, Does Direct Democracy Reduce the Size of 
Government? New Evidence from Historical Data, 1890-2000, June 2009 
 
2694 Kirsten Wandschneider and Nikolaus Wolf, Shooting on a Moving Target: Explaining 
European Bank Rates during the Interwar Period, June 2009 
 
2695 J. Atsu Amegashie, Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan’s 
Dilemma, June 2009 
 
2696 Enrico Spolaore and Romain Wacziarg, War and Relatedness, June 2009 
 
2697 Steven Brakman, Charles van Marrewijk and Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Market 
Liberalization in the European Natural Gas Market – the Importance of Capacity 
Constraints and Efficiency Differences, July 2009 
 
2698 Huifang Tian, John Whalley and Yuezhou Cai, Trade Sanctions, Financial Transfers 
and BRIC’s Participation in Global Climate Change Negotiations, July 2009 
 
2699 Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer, Government Decentralization as a Disincentive 
for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis, July 2009 
 
2700 Balázs Égert, Tomasz Koźluk and Douglas Sutherland, Infrastructure and Growth: 
Empirical Evidence, July 2009 
 
2701 Felix Bierbrauer, Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large 
Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty, July 2009 
 
2702 Marc Gronwald, Investigating the U.S. Oil-Macroeconomy Nexus using Rolling 
Impulse Responses, July 2009 
 
2703 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Government Deficits in the European Union: An Analysis 
of Entry and Exit Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2704 Stergios Skaperdas, The Costs of Organized Violence: A Review of the Evidence, July 
2009  
2705 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, Spend-and-tax: A Panel Data Investigation for 
the EU, July 2009 
 
2706 Bruno S. Frey, Punishment – and beyond, July 2009 
 
2707 Michael Melvin and Mark P. Taylor, The Crisis in the Foreign Exchange Market, July 
2009 
 
2708 Firouz Gahvari, Friedman Rule in a Model with Endogenous Growth and Cash-in-
advance Constraint, July 2009 
 
2709 Jon H. Fiva and Gisle James Natvik, Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public 
Investment?, July 2009 
 
2710 Jarko Fidrmuc and Iikka Korhonen, The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on 
Business Cycles in Asian Emerging Economies, July 2009 
 
2711 J. Atsu Amegashie, Incomplete Property Rights and Overinvestment, July 2009 
 
2712 Frank R. Lichtenberg, Response to Baker and Fugh-Berman’s Critique of my Paper, 
“Why has Longevity Increased more in some States than in others?”, July 2009 
 
2713 Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen and Lars Sørgard, Business Models for Media Firms: 
Does Competition Matter for how they Raise Revenue?, July 2009 
 
2714 Beatrix Brügger, Rafael Lalive and Josef Zweimüller, Does Culture Affect 
Unemployment? Evidence from the Röstigraben, July 2009 
 
2715 Oliver Falck, Michael Fritsch and Stephan Heblich, Bohemians, Human Capital, and 
Regional Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2716 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, 
Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their 
Dynamics, July 2009 
 
2717 Ben J. Heijdra and Jochen O. Mierau, Annuity Market Imperfection, Retirement and 
Economic Growth, July 2009 
 
2718 Kai Carstensen, Oliver Hülsewig and Timo Wollmershäuser, Price Dispersion in the 
Euro Area: The Case of a Symmetric Oil Price Shock, July 2009 
 
2719 Katri Kosonen and Gaёtan Nicodème, The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, July 2009 
 
2720 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Luca Onorante and Paolo Paesani, Inflation and Inflation 
Uncertainty in the Euro Area, July 2009 
 
2721 Thushyanthan Baskaran and Lars P. Feld, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in OECD Countries: Is there a Relationship?, July 2009 
  
2722 Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti, Interest Groups and Government Spending in Italy, 
1876-1913, July 2009 
 
2723 Andreas Wagener, Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation, July 
2009 
 
2724 Hans Fehr and Fabian Kindermann, Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in 
Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes, July 2009 
 
2725 Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl, Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good 
Games with Heterogeneous Populations, July 2009 
 
2726 Kurt Schmidheiny and Marius Brülhart, On the Equivalence of Location Choice 
Models: Conditional Logit, Nested Logit and Poisson, July 2009 
 
2727 Bruno S. Frey, A Multiplicity of Approaches to Institutional Analysis. Applications to 
the Government and the Arts, July 2009 
 
2728 Giovanni Villani, A Strategic R&D Investment with Flexible Development Time in 
Real Option Game Analysis, July 2009 
 
2729 Luca Di Corato and Michele Moretto, Investing in Biogas: Timing, Technological 
Choice and the Value of Flexibility from Inputs Mix, July 2009 
 
2730 Gilad D. Aharonovitz, Nathan Skuza and Faysal Fahs, Can Integrity Replace 
Institutions? Theory and Evidence, July 2009 
 
2731 Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli, Managing Migration through Conflicting 
Policies: an Option-theory Perspective, July 2009 
 
2732 Volker Nitsch, Fly or Cry: Is Airport Noise Costly?, July 2009 
 
2733 Francesco Cinnirella and Joachim Winter, Size Matters! Body Height and Labor Market 
Discrimination: A Cross-European Analysis, July 2009 
 
2734 Samuel Bowles and Sandra Polanía Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social 
Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy, July 2009 
 
2735 Gary Burtless, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for the Design of National Pension 
Systems, July 2009 